Preliminary and incomplete (empirical work will be presented at seminar): Marriage Matching, Risk Sharing and Family Labor Supplies: An Empirical Framework
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper integrates marriage matching with the collective model of spousal labor supplies with full risk sharing. It derives observable implications of how marriage market conditions a¤ect spousal labor supplies. In addition to sex ratio which is an indirect measure, it provides a direct measure of changes in marriage market conditions. The framework also clari es the identifying assumptions necessary to estimate causal e¤ects of marriage market conditions on spousal labor supplies. The empirical section of the paper tests for marriage market e¤ects on spousal labor supplies using data from a panel of US cities. Seitz thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for nancial support.
منابع مشابه
An Empirical Model of Intra-Household Allocations and the Marriage Market∗
We develop an empirical collective matching model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and labor supply decisions. The sharing rule in our collective matching model arises endogenously as a transfer that clears the marriage market. With information on at least two independent marriage markets, incorporating matching in the collective model allows us to identify the sharing rule fr...
متن کاملPreliminary Marriage Matching, Risk Sharing and Spousal Labor Supplies
The paper integrates marriage matching with a collective model of spousal labor supplies with public goods and full spousal risk sharing. The paper derives testable implications of how changes in marriage market conditions affect spousal labor supplies. The model motivates a sufficient statistic for marriage market tightness that is specific to the marital match and highlights several empirical...
متن کاملAn Empirical Model of Intra-Household Allocations and the Marriage Market∗ Preliminary
We develop and estimate an empirical collective matching model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and labor supply decisions. The sharing rule in our collective matching model arises endogenously as a transfer that clears the marriage market. With information on at least two independent marriage markets, incorporating matching in the collective model allows us to identify the sh...
متن کاملThe Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing∗
We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intrahousehold transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on marriage decisions. Introducing the marriage market in the collective model allows us to independently es...
متن کاملDynamic marriage matching: An Empirical Framework∗
The paper proposes a dynamic version of the frictionless Becker-Shapley-Shubik marriage matching model with transferable utility. Its primary objective is to develop a tractable model that rationalizes the marriage distribution of ‘who marries whom’ by age. This behavioral dynamic model rationalizes a new marriage matching function. An empirical methodology that relies on the equilibrium outcom...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006