On Stochastic Acceptance and Gradual Cooperation in Voluntarily Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
نویسنده
چکیده
There has been an accumulation of research on voluntarily repeated prisoners’ dilemma with no information flow. This paper provides a unified comparison of various systems to enforce cooperation, as the matching probability changes. In many cases, the loss of payoff by not being able to adjust actions until the next period turned out to be greater than the loss of payoff by not being able to adjust the acceptance probability. Therefore stochastic acceptance equilibria give higher payoffs than those of gradual cooperation equilibria. The cost associated with the discrete timing of decision making is a new observation that has not been noticed in ordinary repeated games.
منابع مشابه
Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
The Emergence and Evolution of Social Norms: Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
متن کاملCooperation in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Ostracism
The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group’s members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast. putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, ...
متن کاملThe Prisoners' Dilemma Revisited
Cooperation has always been recognised as a fundamental ingredient in the creation of societies and the generation of wealth. As a concept, it has been studied for many years. Yet, in practice, its emergence and persistence are less understood. In the following a game theoretic approach to the study of cooperation based on the Prisoners' Dilemma is reviewed. Using a Genetic Algorithm, strategie...
متن کاملTacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players communicate and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players patient and impatient which are private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types and this is common knowledge then they can cooperate with...
متن کاملPrisoners' Dilemma Supergame on Rectangle Lattice
In this paper a class of large supergames, i.e., infinitely repeated games played by many players are studied. The players located on the vertex set of planar rectangle lattice play several basic games with his neighbors. The basic game is two-person prisoners’ dilemma game with asymmetric payoffs. Under the conditions of the pre-specified updating rules and the transition probabilities, the re...
متن کامل