The Case For Context : Eisenhower Post - Revisionism and Third World

In this historiography, the conclusions made by historians of the revisionist camp that assert the hidden handed yet ultimately successful legacy of President Dwight D. Eisenhower is placed under review by considering the work of post-revisionist scholars’ assessment of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy decisions during the 1950s. Specifically, the insights and arguments made by such scholars suggest that the administration’s hasty use of covert action in Guatemala, Iran, and Indonesia failed to recognize national movements and histories, ultimately leading to detrimental effects to both citizen and state. Rather than damn the Eisenhower administration from the safety of hindsight, this paper seeks to give context to this crucial period in American and world history by complicating our understanding of Cold War foreign policies to include geopolitical and economic strategies as well as a deconstruction of the post-colonial environment in which such decisions were enlisted. It will conclude that although Eisenhower’s ultimate goal was to avoid the casualties of conventional global war and the devastation of nuclear aggression, the covert actions pursued during his time in office and the atrocities accrued within the Third World must be given more weight when assessing the president’s legacy.