S0020818316000424jra 109..136

Why do some actors in international politics display remarkable persistence in wartime, while others “cut and run” at the first sign of trouble? I offer a behavioral theory of resolve, suggesting that variation in time and risk preferences can help explain why some actors display more resolve than others. I test the theory experimentally in the context of public opinion about military interventions. The results not only help explain why certain types of costs of war loom larger for certain types of actors but also shed light on some of the behavioral revolution’s contributions more broadly. Why do some leaders and publics display remarkable persistence in military interventions—the British in the Malayan emergency, for example—while others cut and run, like the US in Somalia in 1993? When political scientists ask this question, the answer we typically give has to do with resolve. Resolve is a ubiquitous ingredient in International Relations (IR) theory, used to explain everything from why states win wars, to how they prevail during crisis bargaining, thereby preventing conflict from breaking out.1 Rationalist approaches to the study of international conflict revolve around resolve: if both sides are aware of each other’s levels of motivation, the less resolute side backs down before a crisis can even take place.2 Likewise, it is motivation, not muscle, that is frequently used to explain why great powers fare so poorly in asymmetric conflict, and why the United States was never able to push the North Vietnamese to their “breaking point” during the Vietnam War.3 Yet although we often explain behavior and outcomes in IR by pointing to variation in actors’ levels of resolve, we have trouble modeling this variation itself, and explaining why some actors are more resolved than others. I address this challenge by offering a behavioral theory of resolve, suggesting that variation in time and risk preferences can help explain why some actors display more resolve than others. I seek to explain variations in resolve not only because of the phenomenon’s clear scholarly and political importance but also because it serves as an excellent conceptual vehicle for exploring the new behavioral revolution in IR. Previous versions of this project benefited from remarkably helpful feedback from audiences at Binghamton, Dartmouth, Harvard, Illinois, Kansas, McGill, NYU, OSU, Princeton, UNC, both USCs, UCLA, UC San Diego, UC Santa Barbara, Yale, ISA, and Peace Science, and too many people to name. Portions of the article draw on material from Resolve in International Politics by Joshua D. Kertzer. Copyright © 2016 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission. 1. For example, Maoz 1983; Schelling 1966; Snyder and Diesing 1977. 2. Fearon 1995; Powell 1987. 3. Mack 1974; Mueller 1980. International Organization 71, Supplement 2017, pp. S109–S136 © The IO Foundation, 2017. doi:10.1017/S0020818316000424 h t t p s : / / d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1 0 1 7 / S 0 0 2 0 8 1 8 3 1 6 0 0 0 4 2 4 D o w n l o a d e d f r o m h t t p s : / / w w w . c a m b r i d g e . o r g / c o r e . I P a d d r e s s : 5 4 . 1 9 1 . 4 0 . 8 0 , o n 0 9 S e p 2 0 1 7 a t 0 5 : 2 1 : 1 7 , s u b j e c t t o t h e C a m b r i d g e C o r e t e r m s o f u s e , a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p s : / / w w w . c a m b r i d g e . o r g / c o r e / t e r m s .