Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
نویسندگان
چکیده
• 1 item and N bidders • private valuations: vi ∈ {ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . ,mǫ} • private budgets: bi st b1 < b2 < · · · < bk • private types: t = (v, b) • type distribution: t ∼ π density function: fb(v) distribution function: Fb(v) • monotone hazard rate: (v, b) ≥ (v, b) → 1−Fb(v) fb(v) ≥ 1−Fb′ (v ) f b′ (v ′) • direct mechanism: M = (a, p) allocation probability a(t) (expected) payment p(t) Assumptions • types are iid (hard assumption) • budgets are iid (soft assumption) • type and budget are independent • ǫ = 1
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 150 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014