Electoral control and the human capital of politicians

Expertise and experience are frequently held to be universally desirable political attributes. But under what conditions can voters benefits from improvements in the human capital of their politicians? We address this question in a model of electoral control with two districts, built upon three premises. First, both human capital (quality) and effort are key inputs of a politician’s performance. Second, ensuring that these inputs are employed to the service of constituents requires the provision of electoral incentives. Third, the reward to politicians from the pursuit of alternative activities to direct constituency service in particular, pursuing the internal goals of a party or political faction depends on the human capital and effort decisions of both legislators. Our main result is that an increase in the quality of either politician can worsen electoral control for both voters. As a consequence, voters may be better served by “outsiders,” or amateur candidates with lower levels of expertise and prior experience. JEL Classification: D72, D78, D83.