Robert Boyd , Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare Coordinated Punishment of Defectors
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منابع مشابه
Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare.
Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punish...
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متن کاملRunaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment.
Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the punishment level meted out by individual...
متن کاملDefector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations.
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of costly punishment, besides the usual strategy adoption dynamics we also apply strategy mutations. As expected, frequent mutations create kind of well-mixed cond...
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