Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process

Regulatory engagement theory [Higgins, E. T. (2006). Value from hedonic experience and engagement. Psychological Review, 113, 439–460.] proposes that value is a motivational force of attraction to or repulsion from something, and that strength of engagement contributes to value intensity independent of hedonic and other sources of value direction. This paper reviews different sources of engagement strength, including dealing with challenges by opposing interfering forces and overcoming personal resistance, preparing for something that is likely to happen, and using “fit” or “proper” means of goal pursuit. We present evidence that each of these sources of engagement strength can intensify the value of something, and we show how stronger engagement can not only make something positive more positive but also make something negative more negative. We also discuss how these effects of stronger engagement on the value of something else are independent of actors' own personal experiences during goal pursuit. We then broaden regulatory engagement theory by describing the nature of these personal experiences from different sources of engagement strength—distinct positive experiences (e.g., feeling “pleasure” vs. feeling “right”) and distinct negative experiences (e.g., feeling “tension” vs. feeling “defiance”)—and consider the science and art of combining them with engagement strength for maximal persuasion and influence. © 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Engaging the consumer: the science and art of the value creation process Individuals are motivated by goals. Whether those goals are fleeting (e.g., “I want the latest flat-screen TV”) or fundamental (e.g., “I want to be safe and secure”), they are critical for understanding consumer behavior. When we think about goals, we often focus on what it is that people want or don't want in terms of desired and undesired end-states (i.e., on goal outcomes). People want to be healthy (not ill), trendy (not frumpy), and fulfilled (not unsatisfied). Because outcomes are salient, perhaps particularly in consumer contexts, it makes sense that we often pay most attention to the relation between outcomes and what consumers value. Yet outcomes or endstates are only one part of understanding motivation within goal pursuit. The process of goal pursuit also matters. People can pursue goals, for example, using either eager or vigilant strategies. Sometimes goal pursuit is smooth and uninterrupted and other times obstacles are encountered. Sometimes individuals have to overcome their own resistance (e.g., dislike of washing the dishes) in order to achieve a desired outcome (e.g., ⁎ Corresponding authors. 1057-7408/$ see front matter © 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Publish doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.02.002 a clean kitchen) and sometimes no personal resistance is experienced. In this paper, we argue that to understand how much or how little people value something (i.e., value intensity), it's important to consider not only the outcomes of goal pursuit but also the process and, especially, strength of engagement in the goal pursuit activity itself. Value as defined in relation to outcomes reflects the nature of the end-state—what it is that people want or the ultimate goal. Historically, an outcome is valued to the extent that it is useful or satisfies some need (e.g., Gibson, 1979; Weiner, 1972; Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954) or produces pleasure and not pain (e.g., Bentham, 1988/1781) (for a more extensive discussion, see Higgins, 2007). From these classic perspectives, the extent to which Kayla will value her cellphone could depend on its ability to fulfill her needs (e.g., a need for belongingness and connectedness with others) or because it provides her the pleasurable experiences of listening to her music and viewing photos while on the subway. Value as defined in relation to process reflects how the goal pursuit activity itself is experienced. In consumer contexts, this may often reflect decision-making processes (e.g., the decisionmaking strategy Kayla used in deciding whether or not to purchase her cellphone). However, we conceptualize process ed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 101 E.T. Higgins, A.A. Scholer / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 100–114 quite broadly to include any factors that affect the actor's experiences during the goal pursuit activity, including situational factors that are background to the purpose of the goal pursuit. For example, the fact that Kayla relied primarily on her feelings to make the decision (a personal factor) and the fact that Kayla had to deal with other customers' loud voices while she was talking to the salesperson about features of the different cellphones (a situational factor) both contribute to how she experiences the goal pursuit activity and could impact how much she values the phone she selected. In many motivational models, the process of goal pursuit contributes to the value of the desired end-state (the goal object or value target) only indirectly through the contribution of particular means to achieving that desired end-state. The process may be valued because it is socially prescribed (e.g., having value from satisfying some social norm), because it is effective (i.e., has high instrumental value), or because it is efficient (i.e., has low costs). It's also been argued that the process may be valued when it meets the criteria for multifinality, fulfilling both the focal attainment goal and some other background goal (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002; Kruglanski, 2006). In these conceptualizations, what is valued about the process is its contribution to attaining various outcomes (high benefits with low costs). However, we believe that the goal pursuit process can contribute more to value beyond its relation to attaining high benefits with low costs. This is because the activity of pursuing a goal involves engagement, and there are different sources of the strength of people's engagement. This has two effects: (a) the strength of engagement in the goal pursuit contributes directly to the value intensity of the goal object (a goal-object, value intensification effect) and (b) the different sources of Fig. 1. Illustration of proposed relations among v engagement strength contribute different experiential qualities to the goal pursuit activity (a goal-pursuit, activity experience effect). Thus, the process variable of engagement strength, together with its sources, contributes to value in multiple ways that need to be appreciated more fully. Regulatory engagement theory Regulatory engagement theory (Higgins, 2006; see also Higgins, Camacho, Idson, Spiegel & Scholer 2008) proposes that value is a motivational force experience (cf. Lewin, 1951). Experiencing something as having positive value corresponds to experiencing attraction toward it (e.g., trying to move toward it) and experiencing something as having negative value corresponds to experiencing repulsion from it (e.g., trying to move away from it). As a motivational force experience, the value experience varies not only in direction but also in intensity (i.e., as relatively weak or strong). The two force experiences of direction and intensity, while experienced holistically, are distinct from one another with respect to their sources. That is, the sources that contribute to value intensity can be independent of those that contribute to value direction. The hedonic experience associated with the value target, i.e., the subjective pleasure/pain properties of the end-state or goal object, is a major contributor to value direction, but there are other contributors to the forces of attraction or repulsion as well. For example, as shown in Fig. 1, a factor such as need satisfaction may provide value direction even if it does not produce a hedonic experience (e.g., the target satisfies a vitamin deficiency). Individuals may also experience a force of attraction towards a target because of shared beliefs with others about what's desired and what's accepted (i.e., norms and standards), at both interpersonal and even broader societal ariables contributing to the value experience. 102 E.T. Higgins, A.A. Scholer / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 100–114 levels. Notably, these sources of value also contribute to the intensity of the value experience. But, as shown in Fig. 1, they are not the only contributor. What is unique about the regulatory engagement model is its consideration of sources of value intensity that are nondirectional. Specifically, there are sources of engagement strength which contribute to the intensity, but not the direction, of the value force experience. Engagement is a state of being involved, occupied, fully absorbed, or engrossed in something—sustained attention. In our lab, engagement strength has been measured in a number of different ways—arm pressure during task engagement (Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998), task persistence (Förster, et. al., 1998), attention to the central merits of a task (Bianco, Higgins, & Klem, 2003; Cesario & Higgins, 2008), and task performance (Bianco et al., 2003; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). The more strongly an individual is engaged, the more intense the motivational force experience. Consequently, an individual who is more strongly engaged in goal pursuit will experience a positive target more positively and a negative target more negatively. Once again, as shown in Fig. 1, hedonic properties can themselves contribute to engagement strength. For example, the anticipated pleasure of drinking a bottle of 1990 Château Pétrus may lead to greater engagement than the anticipated pleasure of drinking a bottle of Charles Shaw. However, as shown in Fig. 1, a target's hedonic properties are not the only source of engagement strength. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on an exploration of sources of engagement strength that are independent from sources of value direction and that arise from the goal pursuit process itself rather than from the target's hedonic properties. We focus on how three distinct aspects of the goal pursuit process—the impact of obstacles and challenges, the experienced likelihood of outcome attainment, and the use of “fit” and “proper” means in goal pursuit— contribute to increased strength of engagement. We conclude by discussing some lingering questions and possibilities for future research. Dealing with challenges Challenges are common during goal pursuits. Whether individuals oppose outside interfering forces (e.g., bad weather during an early morning run) or overcome inside personal resistance (e.g., not wanting to get out of bed), they experience an increased strength of engagement if they initiate and maintain the goal pursuit. Thus, even when these challenges are unpleasant, they can increase the attraction toward a positive target. In this section, we discuss how dealing with challenges encountered in the process of goal pursuit contributes to value intensity. Opposing interfering forces Interfering forces in goal pursuit are any forces that could hinder, impede, or obstruct a preferred course of action. Interfering forces can be physical barriers, other people (e.g., authority figures), endogenous to the task (e.g., a difficult puzzle), or part of the background (e.g., distracting sounds). Here, we focus on how two kinds of interfering forces—threats to freedom and difficulty/adversity—can strengthen engagement and create value. Interfering forces themselves do not create engagement; however, when individuals oppose interfering forces, the opposition strengthens engagement that intensifies value. That opposition is involved in value creation was noted by Lewin (1935), who described the situation, familiar to parents, of children valuing an activity more strongly after it has been prohibited by an adult. The idea was developed further in social psychological research on reactance theory (Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). Reactance theory concerns people's desires to be autonomous agents of their own destiny. When an individual's freedom is threatened, he or she will react so as to protect and restore that freedom. An early study (Brehm, 1966) provided evidence that one way in which people attempt to restore their freedom is by increasing the value of an object that is eliminated from their choice set. According to reactance theory, the underlying mechanism for value creation is a motivation to restore a freedom that has been eliminated or threatened with elimination. It is also possible that another mechanism for value creation exists through increased engagement strength. When individuals experience a positive option being taken away, they can oppose this interfering force, which strengthens their engagement in what they're doing. This would intensify that option's attractiveness. Threats to freedom not only come through reducing options. As Lewin (1935) noted, they also come through the prohibitions and counter-recommendations of others. For instance, warning labels on violent television programs, designed to decrease interest, often backfire and increase interest in watching the programs (Bushman & Stack, 1996). Recommendations, even in more innocuous forms, can create interfering forces to be opposed. In a recent study by Fitzsimons and Lehmans (2004, Study 2), for example, participants were presented with a choice between four granola bars, one of which was clearly the most attractive (dominant) option. When the subjective importance was high (the stakes were real—participants would have an opportunity to take home their chosen granola bar) and an expert recommended against the most attractive granola bar, they were significantly more likely to choose it and were even more confident in the value of their choice (more likely to believe it was the “right” choice). Despite the fact that participants in the high reactance condition reported less satisfaction in the decision process and greater difficulty when making the decision, they valued the chosen granola bar more. This illustrates how an outside factor in goal pursuit that produces an unpleasant experience of the goal pursuit activity can intensify attraction toward the value target by strengthening engagement. We believe that the distinction between the experience of the goal pursuit activity itself and the intensity experience of the target's value has significant implications—a point we expand on in the final section of this paper. 103 E.T. Higgins, A.A. Scholer / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 100–114 People's sensitivity to others' attempts at persuasion can impact how they respond to threats to their freedom. For instance, individuals who are high in reactance more generally may be even more likely to oppose perceived threats to freedom, further increasing the attractiveness of the “forbidden” option (Bushman & Stack, 1996; Fitzsimons & Lehman, 2004). People may also vary in how much and when they are aware of others' persuasion techniques, as highlighted by the “persuasion knowledge model” (Friestad & Wright, 1994). This means that there is likely to be considerable variability in the extent to which perceived threats to freedom, as interfering forces, are opposed. A perceived threat to freedom is not the only kind of interfering force that people will oppose. There are other kinds of forces that interfere with goal pursuit by increasing the difficulty or adversity that is encountered in the goal pursuit. Some tasks (the Sunday NY Times crossword puzzle) are more difficult than others (the Monday NY times crossword puzzle). Sometimes the conditions under which one engages in a task are more difficult than others (e.g., writing an article to the strains of a jackhammer vs. Bach). Sometimes physical barriers are encountered (e.g., the stairs have to be taken to one's favorite shop because the elevator is broken). Although the sources of difficulty vary, all have the potential to strengthen engagement. However, whether or not difficulty strengthens engagement depends on whether or not individuals oppose the interfering force. If individuals oppose difficulty or adversity, engagement is strengthened. If, however, difficulty or adversity results in individuals deciding not to initiate action in the first place or to give up during pursuit, engagement will be weakened. Importantly, even if individuals persist in goal pursuit, they may respond to difficulty or adversity in different ways. Consider, for example, trying to cope with a distracting background noise while working on a task. If the distraction is perceived as an interfering force that must be overcome in order to succeed on the task, it is likely to strengthen engagement. However, if the distraction is perceived as an aversive nuisance with which one must cope, it is likely to weaken engagement by drawing attention away from the task to the coping efforts (e.g., emotion-focused coping). Although the adversity is unpleasant in each case, regulatory engagement theory predicts that stronger engagement in the task from opposing interference and weaker engagement in the task from coping efforts would have opposite effects on the value intensity of the goal pursuit target. Indeed, we (Higgins, Marguc, & Scholer, 2009) recently obtained evidence that the effect of a background challenge on value creation depends on how individuals treat the challenge. In two studies, participants worked to solve enough anagrams to receive an attractive prize while an aversive noise played in the background. All participants succeeded in winning the prize. The dependent measure was the perceived value of the prize object. In one study, participants were randomly assigned to two different background noises: a tape of dentist drills and a tape of words. Both background noises were aversive, but only the “words” directly interfered with the task of solving verbal anagrams. Thus, we expected participants to oppose the interfering “words” but to cope with the nuisance “drills”. In a second study, all participants heard the same aversive sound but it was presented either as an “interference to oppose” or as “a nuisance to cope with”. To the extent that participants perceived the background noise as a difficulty to either oppose or cope with, we found, as predicted, that the prize increased in value for the “words” and “opposing interference” conditions but decreased in value for the “drills” and “coping with a nuisance” conditions. Overcoming personal resistance At times barriers spring from within, not without. And even when an obstacle is external, the real challenge can be to overcome one's own personal resistance in order to engage in some pursuit. This is especially true when goal pursuit involves some unavoidable unpleasantness or has some real costs associated with it. When people know that some aversiveness is inevitable if they engage in a particular goal pursuit, they naturally resist the goal pursuit initially. However, if they overcome this initial resistance by freely choosing to pursue the goal (fully aware of its unpleasant aspects), they experience increased commitment to the pursuit (Brickman, 1987). Just as opposing external interfering forces strengthens engagement, so too does overcoming personal resistance. As Brickman (1987) noted, the phenomenon of value creation from overcoming personal resistance is most prominently associated with studies testing cognitive dissonance theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Engaging in goal pursuit despite being aware of its high costs can be thought of as inducing dissonance because of the presence of two inconsistent cognitions: “This is unpleasant” and “I freely chose to do it”. Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that one way people can attempt to reduce this dissonance is by changing their attitude toward the value target (i.e., value increase from justification). An additional mechanism is strengthened engagement from overcoming resistance. When the value target is initially positive, stronger engagement would intensify its positivity. The implication is that a little personal resistance, if overcome, can be a good thing for value creation. In a classic study on effort justification (Aronson & Mills, 1959), for example, female participants who went through a relatively severe initiation in order to join a group (reading sexually explicit words in front of a male experimenter) subsequently valued the group more than did female participants who did not face a severe initiation process (see also Axsom & Cooper, 1985; Zimbardo, 1965). In a more recent study (Fishbach & Trope, 2005), participants who overcame their resistance to the short-term costs (taking a test in a the middle of the night) associated with long-term benefits (individualized diagnostic information about their own cognitive functioning at night) valued the diagnostic test more than did participants who did not face these short-term costs. In a consumer context, Dick and Lord (1998) have found that individuals who paid a membership fee to access some service 104 E.T. Higgins, A.A. Scholer / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 100–114 (e.g., to join a video store, gym, etc.) valued the store more than those who had not paid a membership fee (see also Arkes and Blumer, 1985). Notably, Freud (1958/1913) argued that patients should pay a fee for therapy because fees were an indispensable part of the curative motivation in therapy. In the above studies, a positive value target became more attractive when engagement was strengthened by overcoming personal resistance. Strengthening engagement by overcoming personal resistance should also intensify the negativity of a negative value target. Sehnert, Franks, and Higgins (2009) recently tested this prediction in a study on scarcity value. According to basic economics, the demand for something is higher when its supply is lower (holding price constant). The competitive nature of humans leads to the desire to be special by possessing objects that other don't and can't easily have. The idea is that the property of scarcity itself activates these motives and makes a scarce item more valuable independent of that item's other properties (see Carew, 1996), as long as the item is attractive enough to be wanted. The study by Sehnert et al. (2009) met this requirement by excluding any participant who reported that they disliked the value target (yogurt) or who was full when the session began. Participants were told that they could try a taste of either Yogurt A or Yogurt B that appeared together on a tray. On the tray was just a single cup of Yogurt A along with several cups of Yogurt B. Thus, Yogurt A appeared more scarce than Yogurt B. This apparent scarcity, however, was reduced in the Low Scarcity condition by telling participants that whatever cup of yogurt they chose to taste would be replaced by another cup of the same yogurt for the next participant in the study. Participants in the High Scarcity condition thought the yogurt would not be replaced. After making their decision, all participants took a taste of the yogurt they had chosen. Unbeknownst to the participants, Yogurt A and Yogurt B were exactly the same yogurt. One might expect that Yogurt A, especially with no replacement, would be chosen most often because it would have higher scarcity value. However, the more scarce it is, the stronger the norm would apply against selfishly “taking the last one”. Thus, there are two forces operating in opposite directions. For the participants in this study, the normative force was apparently stronger than the scarcity value force because more participants chose Yogurt B than Yogurt A. But the central question is how much did participants value their chosen yogurt? Two measures of value were taken after the participants took their first taste of the yogurt—assigned monetary price, “How much would you be willing to pay for a cup of this yogurt, given that a typical cup of yogurt that size costs $2.50?” and desire to eat more of the yogurt. Note that the social norm against selfishness is not a factor when these measures of value are taken. According to the standard notion of scarcity value, participants in the High Scarcity condition who chose Yogurt A should value it more than participants in the Low Scarcity condition who chose Yogurt A. Regulatory engagement theory, however, has a different perspective. In the high scarcity condition, a situation of scarcity has been created. This scarcity situation should strengthen engagement in the decision-making process. According to regulatory engagement theory, then, engagement would be stronger for the participants in the High Scarcity condition than the Low Scarcity condition. Stronger engagement would intensify the value response to the chosen yogurt (whether A or B). Because the chosen yogurt is always the same slightly bitter yogurt and participants dislike this yogurt once they have tasted it, in the High Scarcity condition the chosen yogurt should become even more unattractive, i.e., its value should be less, than in the Low Scarcity condition. On both measures of value, this is precisely what Sehnert et al. (2009) found. Consumer psychology implications of dealing with challenges How might consumers' responses to dealing with challenges work not only to support the hoped-for outcomes of salespeople but also to impede them? Imagine Jack, an avid PC user. The recommendation by a Computer World salesclerk that he consider switching to a Mac is experienced as a constraining force. Jack's opposition to this interfering force strengthens his engagement, leading him to value his PC even more highly. However, what if Jack decided to switch to a Mac? The strengthened engagement from overcoming his own personal resistance could now lead him to value the Mac more highly than if he had experienced no initial resistance at all. Which scenario is desirable from the perspective of the salesclerk would depend on what the salesclerk really wants. The salesclerk, for example, could secretly want Jack to stick to the more expensive PC option. Whatever the true goal, to be effective the salesclerk needs to clearly identify the value target and predict the effects of obstacles and challenges. If two attractive options are kept in mind during a difficult decision, for example, it is possible for both options to increase in attractiveness. Now that outcome would be highly beneficial for a salesclerk who was selling both options. Apart from the study by Sehnert et al. (2009), we have only begun to investigate negative value targets. Here, we wish to note that there are interesting implications for consumer researchers about the relation between engagement strength and value intensity for negative targets. People can feel ambivalent or even negative towards new products and services. In these situations, stronger engagement would lead consumers to have more intense negative responses. Given this implication, it's important to consider how individuals feel about the value target. In the negative case, interventions that weaken engagement could actually produce better outcomes than interventions that strengthen engagement. Preparing for something that is likely to happen Challenges, especially barriers to goal pursuit, can also affect engagement strength in another way by changing the likelihood that a goal will be reached. The variable of likelihood (or expectancy), however, is more general and can be affected by factors other than barriers to goal pursuit. Likelihood concerns perceptions or beliefs that something will or will not happen, 105 E.T. Higgins, A.A. Scholer / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 100–114 regardless of the source of those beliefs. Individual's likelihood beliefs have long been recognized as an important component in models of value (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Edwards, 1955; Lewin, Dumbo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944; Tolman, 1955; Vroom, 1964). In general, the subjective utility model of motivation has assumed that the subjective likelihood of a given outcome combines multiplicatively with the subjective value of that outcome to determine value intensity. For example, a high likelihood of experiencing a positive outcome would produce a greater force of attraction than a low likelihood of that outcome. In these models, beliefs about the likelihood of a specific outcome are important because of the information they communicate about whether a particular future outcome will occur, with the only motivating force (the pull) coming from the subjective value of the outcomes themselves—value from having desired results (Higgins, 2009). In addition, when there are two possible outcomes, A or B, a high likelihood of A (e.g., 80%) is equivalent to a low likelihood of B (e.g., 20%). Regulatory engagement theory has a different perspective on the variable of likelihood (or expectancy) than the classic subjective utility model (or value-expectancy model). It considers likelihood to have motivational force in its own right because it concerns another way of being effective. Specifically, the likelihood of something happening not only communicates information, but also contributes to establishing what's real (i.e., to truth effectiveness; see Higgins, 2009). In so doing, subjective likelihood can also create value by strengthening and weakening engagement (Higgins, 2006). When people experience high (vs. low) likelihood, future outcomes feel real. Consequently, individuals are likely to engage themselves fully (be highly involved and absorbed) in what they are doing—prepare for something that will really happen. Moreover, when there are two possible outcomes, A or B, experiencing a high likelihood of A is not equivalent to experiencing a low likelihood of B because the first experience strengthens engagement—induces preparation for A—whereas the second experience weakens engagement (no need to prepare for B). In a recent test of this proposed effect of likelihood by Higgins, Franks, & Pavarini (2009), undergraduates believed that they were participating in a marketing study for a new dairy company that was conducting a study to decide what would become their newest flavor of yogurt. They were told that in the first part of the study, they would taste two yogurt flavors that each represented a general flavor category (A category and B category). Participants were further told that in the second part of the study they would try more concentrations within just one of these general flavor categories. Unbeknownst to participants, one yogurt was pre-tested to be good-tasting (sugar and nutmeg flavor) and one of the yogurts was pre-tested to be bad-tasting (clove flavor) (Botti & Iyengar, 2004). In some conditions there was a high probability of later trying various concentrations of the good yogurt flavor (i.e., expressed either as 80% chance of the good or as 20% of the bad), whereas in other conditions there was a high probability of later trying various concentrations of the bad yogurt flavor (i.e., expressed as 80% chance of the bad or as 20% of the good). It is not clear how anticipating positive or negative future tastings, respectively, would influence the value of the specific yogurts that were currently being tasted. Strictly speaking, the subjective utility model is silent on this because the probabilities are not about tasting the two yogurts now. Perhaps, looking forward to tasting more of the good yogurt later would make people feel good in the present, and being upset about tasting more of the bad yogurt later would make people feel bad in the present. But, in any case, the effect would be opposite for the probable good yogurt versus the probable bad yogurt. In addition, the logic of subjective utility equates high probability of tasting more of the good yogurt (80%) with low probability of tasting more of the bad yogurt (20%) because these refer to the same future outcome—high probability of the good yogurt. (And similarly for 80% probability of the bad yogurt and 20% probability of the good yogurt.) Regulatory engagement theory, in contrast, proposes that expressed high likelihoods not only communicate information about a future outcome but also strengthen engagement in the present because the motivational system begins to prepare for what is likely to happen. And this effect on strengthening engagement is independent of whether the expressed high likelihood is for the good yogurt or the bad yogurt. Whether preparing for a future good yogurt to happen (expressed high likelihood for the good yogurt) or preparing for a future bad yogurt to happen (expressed high likelihood for the bad yogurt), the current motivational system becomes more strongly engaged. From this perspective, then, high likelihood of tasting more of the good yogurt (80%) and low likelihood of tasting more of the bad yogurt (20%) are not the same, and high likelihood of tasting more of the bad yogurt (80%) and low likelihood of tasting the good yogurt (20%) are not the same. What is the same is expressed high likelihood of the good yogurt or expressed high likelihood of the bad yogurt. What matters is preparing in the present for something represented as likely to happen in the future, thereby strengthening engagement. And what stronger engagement should do in the present is intensify participants' value reactions to the two yogurts—make the good yogurt more attractive and the bad yogurt more repulsive. In support of this “likelihood as preparing for something” prediction, Higgins et al. (2009) found that under conditions of expressed high likelihood, compared to expressed low likelihood, participants' ratings of the good yogurt flavor were more positive and their ratings of the bad yogurt flavor were more negative. This general high versus low expressed likelihood effect was independent of whether the expressed high likelihood was in relation to the good yogurt or the bad yogurt, and was independent of whether the expressed low likelihood was in relation to the good yogurt or the bad yogurt. This was also reflected in participants' willingness to pay for the yogurts under high versus low likelihood conditions. Participants were willing to pay more for the good yogurt and less for the bad yogurt under conditions of expressed high (vs. low) likelihood, regardless of whether the expressed high likelihood was in relation to the good or the bad yogurt. This study shows that the expressed likelihood of later receiving a particular yogurt category in Part 2 of the study— 106 E.T. Higgins, A.A. Scholer / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 100–114 independent of the actual probability of a particular future outcome—affected the present value of both yogurts in Part 1 of the study. This is an intriguing phenomenon whose breadth of applicability needs to be investigated. Future studies need to explore how broadly preparing for something to happen in the future can change the value intensity of a target in the present. Can the expressed likelihood of a future event (e.g., playing some computer game), that has no relation whatsoever to a current value target (e.g., yogurt), still influence how that current target is evaluated? This possibility is currently being investigated. Using “fit” or “proper” means of goal pursuit In this section, we discuss one of the central concepts that comes to mind when thinking about the goal pursuit process— the means that individuals use when pursuing goals. Traditionally, as we discussed earlier, means are often seen to contribute to value insofar as they make a hedonic contribution to the outcome—increasing benefits while decreasing costs. In this section, we discuss additional ways in which the means that people adopt can affect value intensity by strengthening engagement in the goal pursuit process.