Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance
نویسنده
چکیده
Separation between CEO and Chairman of the Board is typically viewed as evidence of good corporate governance. Surprisingly, the literature has failed so far to uncover any significant relation between CEO/Chairman duality and firm performance. By distinguishing between periods with and without CEO turnover, we empirically identify two offsetting effects: the correlation between duality and performance is positive around CEO turnover and negative otherwise. This indicates that the competition for managerial talent forces firms to combine CEO and Chairman in order to attract more skilled CEOs at the cost of reducing governance standards. JEL classification: D82, G21, G18.
منابع مشابه
Competition for Managers, Corporate Governance and Incentive Compensation
We propose a model in which firms compete to attract better managers by using corporate governance as part of an optimal executive compensation scheme. Higher governance decreases the cost of taking disciplinary actions against managers, but when managerial talent is scarce, competition among firms to attract better managers implies that firms under-invest in governance. The reason is that mana...
متن کاملاثر تعدیل کنندگی راهبری شرکتی بر ارتباط بین رقابت در بازار محصول و کیفیت سود پیش بینی شده توسط مدیریت
رقابت در بازار محصول عامل موثری بر جریان و حجم اطلاعات عرضه شده توسط واحدهای تجاری است. همچنین ساختار راهبری شرکتی می‌تواند نقش موثری بر کیفیت اطلاعات ارائه شده داشته باشد. بر این اساس هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی نقش راهبری شرکتی بر رابطه بین رقابت در بازار محصول و کیفیت سود پیش بینی شده توسط مدیریت در شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران می‌باشد. به همین منظور داد...
متن کاملCorporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers
We provide new rationales for corporate venturing (CV), based on competition for talented managers. As returns to venturing increase, rms engage in CV for reasons other than capturing these returns. First, higher venturing returns increase managerial compensation, to which rms respond by increasing the power of incentives. Managers increase e¤ort, prompting rms to reallocate them to new vent...
متن کاملBoard of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values
This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate t...
متن کاملThe Role of Corporate Governance on Tax Justice (Horizontal Equity and Vertical Equity)
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of corporate governance in the concept of tax justice. The current research contributes to the field of applied research and is regarded as a descriptive survey research, testing four main hypotheses and eight special hypotheses. The required data for this research were obtained through a questionnaire distributed among financial managers of 133 ...
متن کامل