Core of Coalition Games on MV-algebras1
نویسنده
چکیده
Coalition games are generalized to semisimple MV-algebras. Coalitions are viewed as [0,1]-valued functions on a set of players, which enables to express a degree of membership of a player in a coalition. Every game is a real-valued mapping on a semisimple MV-algebra. The goal is to recover the so-called core: a set of final distributions of payoffs, which are represented by measures on the MV-algebra. A class of sublinear games are shown to have a non-empty core and the core is completely characterized in certain special cases. The interpretation of games on propositional formulas in Łukasiewicz logic is introduced.
منابع مشابه
A Generalized Möbius Transform of Games on MV-algebras and Its Application to a Cimmino-type Algorithm for the Core
A generalization of the Möbius transform of games with finitely many players is introduced for games on MV-algebras. The variety of MValgebras subsumes most coalition models. We characterize the class of games for which the generalized Möbius transform exists. An application of the proposed transform to a Cimmino-type algorithm is shown for the core solution in games with finitely-many players.
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