Trust as a Mediating Variable in a Complex Model of Channel Member Behaviour

The purpose of this study is to develop and test a model of channel member behaviour that hypothesises a central mediating effect for trust between power constructs and key behavioural and attitudinal relationship outcomes. The model is tested on a large sample in a single channel using a dyadic approach. INTRODUCTION In the channels literature, research involving behavioural constructs is extensive. However, there has been a call for more comprehensive models to explain channel phenomena (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1984; Anderson and Narus 1990; Gattorna 1978, Stern and Reve 1980). For instance, Stern and Reve (1980, p. 52) consider that “published studies related to distribution channels present, collectively, a rather disjointed collage.” Anderson and Narus (1990, p. 55) argue that “though two or three-construct studies, which characterize much of our knowledge in marketing channels, contribute to our knowledge of marketing channels, many such studies would have to be done to investigate systematically all of the construct interrelationships specified by a more comprehensive model.” In this study the aim was to expand previous research by examining explanatory processes, by model building and by testing the role of critical behavioural constructs in a comprehensive nomological net. Although this research started by an exploratory correlational analysis, a much more powerful methodology—structural equation modelling— was used to obtain more robust information about how constructs interrelate. A major aim was to develop and test a fairly comprehensive model of channel member behaviour, specifically to investigate empirically the relationships among power asymmetry, coercive power, non-coercive power, trust, cooperation, conflict, and satisfaction with the overall channel relationship. The research aims to contribute to an understanding of how trust is created and how it affects critical relationship outcomes (cooperation, conflict, and satisfaction). In the last decade the channels literature has shown a pervasive and continuing interest in trust. The central role of trust in relationship building and maintenance has been emphasised. As a result, channel researchers have increasingly incorporated trust in models of channel relationships. Although many constructs have been related to trust, power has been neglected. This research covers such a gap. The general hypothesis of our model is that trust acts as a central mediating variable between power constructs (power asymmetry, coercive power, and non-coercive power) and key behavioural outcomes—cooperation, conflict, and satisfaction. A MODEL OF CHANNEL MEMBER BEHAVIOUR: THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIPS A fairly comprehensive model of channel member behaviour involving power asymmetry, the use of power (coercively and non-coercively), trust, satisfaction with the overall channel relationship, cooperation and conflict is proposed. Further, trust is proposed as a central mediating variable between power constructs and those of satisfaction, conflict, and cooperation. Figure 1 depicts the proposed model of channel member behaviour. Figure 1 – Model of Marketing Channel Member Behaviour Power Asymmetry and the Choice of Influence Strategy. Power, in the general use of the concept, means the ability of one individual or group to control or influence the behaviour of another (Hunt and Nevin 1974). Unbalanced or asymmetric power relationships create the potential for exploitation of vulnerable channel partners by powerful firms (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995b), therefore affecting the choice of influence strategies. Marketing channels research has shown that asymmetric possession of power will tend to be exploited through more frequent use of coercion (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Roering 1977; Wilkinson and Kipnis 1978; Dwyer and Walker 1981; Kale 1986; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Dant and Schul 1992). Hence, it is not surprising that power asymmetry might create in the less powerful channel member fear of being exploited (Geyskens and Steenkamp 1995). Further, dominant partners have little incentive to invest in developing specific programs with their dependent partners (Buchanan 1992). Confirming this assertion, empirical research has Trust