Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study a model of collective decision making in which agents vote on the decision repeatedly until they agree, with the agents receiving no exogenous new information between two voting rounds but incurring a delay cost. Although preference conflict between the agents makes information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting, in the equilibrium of the repeated voting game agents are increasingly more willing to vote their private information after each disagreement. Information is efficiently aggregated within a finite number of rounds. As delay becomes less costly, agents are less willing to vote their private information, and efficient information aggregation takes longer. Even as the delay cost converges to zero, agents are strictly better off in the repeated voting game than in any single round game for moderate degrees of initial conflict. Notes. Li and Suen thank the Guanghua School of Management of Peking University, and especially Hongbin Cai, for their hospitality and research support during their visit. Li wishes to thank the Marshall School of Business of the University of Southern California for hosting his sabbatical when part of the research for this paper is done. We have benefited from comments by Jeff Ely, Roger Gordon, Joel Sobel, and Asher Wolinsky, as well as by other seminar participants at Florida, Northwestern, Singapore Management University, UCLA, UCSD, and USC on presentations based on an earlier version of this paper.
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