Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange
نویسندگان
چکیده
In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson’s recent results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economies, relaxing anonymity and non-bossiness admits mechanisms which, as the economy becomes infinitely large, are asymptotically Walrasian for all except one “balancing” agent, while being manipulable with generically vanishing probability. Also considered are some extensions to non-Walrasian mechanisms. JEL classification: D82, D61, D5
منابع مشابه
Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms
This paper provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in ...nite exchange economies (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economies. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-known trade-o¤ between e¢c...
متن کاملDesigning a Strategy-Proof Spot Market Mechanism with Many Traders: Twenty-Two Steps to Walrasian Equilibrium
To prove their Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, Arrow and Debreu (1954) devised an abstract economy that Shapley and Shubik (1977) cricitized as a market game because, especially with untrustworthy traders, it fails to determine a credible outcome away from equilibrium. All this earlier work also postulated a Walrasian auctioneer with complete information about traders’ preferences and ...
متن کاملFrom singularity theory to finiteness of Walrasian equilibria
The paper establishes that for an open and dense subset of smooth exchange economies, the number of Walrasian equilibria is finite. In particular, our results extend to non-regular economies; it even holds when restricted to the subset of critical ones. The proof rests on concepts from singularity theory.
متن کاملWalrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
This paper studies an exchange economy with indivisibilities. Our main goal is to see if a price system can function well in an economy (e.g., an economy with complementary preferences) that does not have a Walrasian equilibrium. We study the price adjustment processes governed by the Euler iterative scheme. We show that in an economy that has a Walrasian equilibrium, our price adjustment proce...
متن کاملThe Complexity of Exchange*
The computational complexity of two classes of market mechanisms is compared. First the Walrasian interpretation in which prices are centrally computed by an auctioneer. Recent results on the computational complexity are reviewed. The non-polynomial complexity of these algorithms makes Walrasian general equilibrium an implausible conception. Second, a decentralised picture of market processes i...
متن کامل