Is altruism evolutionarily stable
نویسندگان
چکیده
We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome depends on whether the individuals' interactions are strategic complements or substitutes. Altruism and self-interest are context dependent. # 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. JEL classi®cation: A13; C72; D64
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Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionary Stable Symbiosis
Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis
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