On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization
نویسندگان
چکیده
We generalize two existence results for pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games provided by Schmeidler (1973) and Le Breton and Weber (1997). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
منابع مشابه
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces∗
This paper studies the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for nonatomic games where players take actions in an infinite-dimensional Banach space. For any infinitedimensional Banach space, we construct a nonatomic game with actions in this space which has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria, provided that the player space is modeled by the usual Lebesgue unit interval. We also show that if ...
متن کاملOn the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum ofPlayers
We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games. We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper.
متن کاملAsymptotic interpretations for equilibria of nonatomic games
We show that a mixed equilibrium of a semi-anonymous nonatomic game can be used to generate pure-strategy profiles for finite games randomly generated from the type distribution of the nonatomic game. As the numbers of players involved in the finite games increase, the generated profiles will be asymptotically equilibrium. The converse of this result is also true, i.e., a mixed-strategy profile...
متن کاملCascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic players, the coincidence of strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in such games, and the uniqueness of the cost of each given resource across all Nash equilib...
متن کاملCASCADING TO EQUILIBRIUM: HYDRAULIC COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA IN RESOURCE SELECTION GAMES By
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games with nonatomic players, the coincidence of strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in such games, and the invariance of the cost of each given resource across all Nash equilibria. Our proofs allow for explicit calculation...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 31 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003