Freedom and Strength of Will: Descartes and Albritton

In defending absolute freedom of the will, Albritton distinguishes freedom of will from two other notions with which it is often confused. First, he argues decisively against the pervasive tendency to identify freedom of will with freedom of (bodily) action.[2] To restrict someone's freedom of movement, by putting him in chains or even by administering curare, is not to diminish the will's freedom. Such measures diminish only the efficacy of the will, that is, they disable the will, but they do not affect its freedom. On Albritton's view, our will is free if what we propose to do is up to us.[3] Our will is efficacious if our proposing to do something brings about its being done. Albritton is surely correct that we might freely propose to do something that does not get done because our will is ineffective.