Long–term Equilibria of Repeated Consistently Competitive Games
نویسنده
چکیده
The class of consistently competitive games canonically unifies Prisoner’s Dilemmas, contests, auctions, and Bertrand competitions. If those games are repeated infinitely, the players have to negotiate about the strategies that are to be repeated infinitely. These negotiations, however, are perturbed by the possibility that players make defective proposals (defective proposals are sensibly not maintained in the long term). The opponents’ defections have to be detected and retaliated. In this study, these aspects (negotiations and defections) are analyzed jointly, and (thus) a refinement concept for Folk theorem equilibria is introduced. JEL Classification: C73 (Stochastic and Dynamic Games), C78 (Bargaining Theory), D43 (Oligopoly), D44 (Auctions)
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