Irrelevant Alternatives *
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper examines the notion of irrelevantalternatives in the context of social choice problems. It is shown that seemingly irrelevant alternatives could be relevant because of their information content. This leads to a consideration of aggregation rules where an endogenous condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is imposed. The analysis leads to the characterization of a unique procedure to aggregate preferences Bordas rule. This new characterization provides insight into independence conditions and into the status of Bordas rule. An extension to a domain incorporating interpersonal comparisons is also pursued.
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