Are Nash Bargaining Wage Agreements Unique? An Investigation Into Bargaining Sets For Firm-Union Negotiations
نویسنده
چکیده
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) has long been used to model wage negotiations between firms and unions examples include de Menil (1971), McDonald and Solow (1981), Nickell and Andrews (1983), Anderson and Devereux (1989), Dowrick (1989, 1990), Leslie (1990) and Hoel (1990). Much of this research has chosen quite arbitrary values for the parameters of the NBS the status-quo point and the bargaining power index. However the completion of the Nash programme by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) has helped more recent research to interpret these parameters correctly within the context of wage bargaining.
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