Risk Management: Evidence from Oil Price Hedging in Highway Procurement

There is little empirical evidence about risk management heterogeneity across firm types. I evaluate a policy that shifts oil price risk in highway procurement from the private sector to the government, reducing the cost of hedging to zero. In a tripledifferences design using data from Kansas and Iowa, I show that firms value hedging oil price risk between the auction and commencement of work. Consistent with the prediction that hedging is more valuable for financially constrained firms, I find higher risk premiums in private vis-à-vis public firms and in smaller vis-à-vis larger firms. I also find that family ownership and a lack of diversification are associated with higher risk premiums. Competition is highly imperfect in this industry. Monopoly power in product markets, together with market frictions in derivative hedging, may limit the pass-through of risk to financial markets, and thus prevent efficient allocation of risk.