First Year in Office: How Do New Ceos Create Value?
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines firm value creation associated with CEO turnover. The literature has focused on the heterogeneity in CEOs. We instead focus on the heterogeneity in post-turnover firm strategies, which are significant changes in senior management and operations. We show that the variation in strategy choices has significant explanatory power for the variation in postturnover performance. Examining strategies also advances our understanding of the relationship between CEO types and firm performance, and the effect of strategy tends to subsume the effect of CEO type. Within a firm, the value impact of personnel and operational shakeups is much stronger in turnover years than in non-turnover years. This result is not driven by the prior firm conditions that lead to the change of CEO, and is consistent with the agency view that CEO turnover is part of an error correction process in a corporation. In the cross section, firms that implement post-turnover shakeups outperform those that do not. One explanation supported by the data is that not all firms that choose not to shake up behave optimally due to some agency frictions. Overall, examining post-turnover strategy choices generates valuable new insights because strategies reflect the impact of not only the new CEO but also the institutional environment (e.g., agency frictions) that the new CEO operates in, both of which are relevant for understanding value creation associated with CEO turnover.
منابع مشابه
Homebiased Acquisitions
We show that CEOs exhibit a home bias in acquisitions. Firms are over twice as likely to acquire targets located in their CEOs’ home states than similar targets domiciled elsewhere. The bias is strongest for private targets and when acquirer governance is lax, and these private home deals do not create value, suggesting that CEOs acquire these targets for their own benefits. Unlike typical publ...
متن کاملThe Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term. We find that the impending expiration of fixed-term employment contracts creates incentives for CEOs to engage in strategic window-dressing activities, including managing earnings aggressively and withholding negative firm news. At the same time, acquisit...
متن کاملPersonality Traits among Entrepreneurial and Professional CEOs in SMEs
This is a descriptive, quantitative, and hypotheses testing study conducted on entrepreneurial and professional CEOs. This study has a particular interest in small medium enterprises (SMEs) because it constitutes the core of our economy and is a major factor of social composition. The purpose of present study is to investigate and explore differences on the motivational profile of Pakistani ent...
متن کاملDo CEOs and Principal Financial Officers Take a "Bath" Separately or Together?: An Investigation of Discretionary Accruals Surrounding Appointments of New CEOs and PFOs
This study presents the first targeted examination of changes in financial reporting surrounding the appointment of both new CEOs and Principal Financial Officers (PFOs). We identify companies that appoint new CEOs and PFOs in the period 1995 to 2002 and find that the change in discretionary accruals is negative and significant in the year of hire (from t-1 to t) for firms appointing a new CEO ...
متن کاملStrategic Corporate Social Responsibility and Value Creation among Large Firms Lessons from the Spanish Experience
Can corporate social responsibility (CSR) be a source of good and a wellspring of innovation, competitive advantage and value creation for the firm? Although CEOs and government leaders insist in public that CSR projects create value for the firm, privately they admit that they do not know if CSR pays off. To address this question and drawing on experience for the Spanish context, we test one o...
متن کامل