Expectations about Coalitions and Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation

In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one’s preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one’s preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party. ∗Address: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES), A5 6, D-68159 Mannheim, Phone: +49-(0)621-181-2856, Fax: +49-(0)621-181-2845, Email: [email protected]