Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Information about queue length is an important parameter for customers who face the decision whether to join a queue or not. In this paper, we study how optimal information disclosure policies can be used by a service provider of an M/M/1 queue to increase its revenue. Our main contribution is showing that the intuitive policy of informing customers about the current queue length when it is short and hiding this information when it is long is never optimal.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Oper. Res. Lett.
دوره 44 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016