Math 364: Strategic Games
نویسنده
چکیده
Strategic games: simultaneous choices of 2 or more players • 2 firms: P1 sets q1 and maximizes payoff π1(q1, q2), P2 sets q2 and maximizes payoff π2(q1, q2). Want simultaneous optimal choices given the other player’s choice. • Chapters 2: Finite number of choices for each player • Chapters 3: Continuous choice of quantity for each player • Chapter 4: Play choices probabilistically, mixed strategies • Chapter 13: Evolutionary game theory: how characteristic dominates, aggregate population learns
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