A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing Mays Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment1

نویسندگان

  • Robert E. Goodin
  • Christian List
چکیده

Robert E. Goodin is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and of Social and Political Theory in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. Christian List is Reader in Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK. We thank Steven Brams, Dennis Mueller, Franz Dietrich and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. List also acknowledges …nancial support from the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, where he was a Visiting Research Scholar during the …nal stages of this work.

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تاریخ انتشار 2006