Generic 4 4 Two Person Games
نویسنده
چکیده
versity of Minnesota. We are grateful to Bernhard von Stengel and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Abstract The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1995), who arrives at this result by referring to the enumeration of Gr unbaum and Sreedharan (1967), our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agents.
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