Global Stability of Nash Equilibrium in Submodular Aggregative Games*
نویسندگان
چکیده
If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.
منابع مشابه
Global stability of Nash equilibrium in Aggregative Games
If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which may not be interior and is globally stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.
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