Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind

Many histories of philosophy attempt to classify Hegel as a latterday rationalist. While there is much to be said for such a classification, in the philosophy of mind it can be misleading. For however much Hegel may share with his rationalist predecessors, his philosophy of mind is dominated by very different concerns. The central questions in the rationalist philosophy of mind concern the substantiality, simplicity, immortality, immateriality, and freedom of the soul. The doctrines of concept acquisition, judgment, the nature of sensation and perception, and so forth are developed to support the metaphysical positions at the center of rationalist concern. Despite their interest in concept acquisition, the empiricists, in their reaction against rationalism, retain a strong, though critical, interest in the search for the attributes of the soul. Even in Kant we find that, alongside his revolutionary doctrines of concept acquisition, judgment, and the nature of sensation and perception, the attributes of the soul receive careful attention in the first Critique. But virtually all of these questions simply disappear