Anyone Can Hold An Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
Secure auctions have many potential uses including eVoting, computational resource allocation and FCC spectrum auctions.The SGVA privacy preserving auction scheme is able to conduct combinatorial auctions and keep the losing bid values secret. However, SVGA is a black box so users have no means to assure themselves that the auction has actually taken place and that their bid has been included in the computation of the result. We have designed a verification scheme composed of zero knowledge proofs that extends the basic SGVA secure auction protocol to permit users to verify offline that the protocol has been executed correctly. This is especially useful in environments where participants have no pre-existing trust, such as the Internet.
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