Information Aggregation and Equilibrium Selection in Committees
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A COGNITIVE STYLE AND AGGREGATION OPERATOR MODEL: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH FOR CLASSIFICATION AND SELECTION OF THE AGGREGATION OPERATORS
Aggregation operators (AOs) have been studied by many schol- ars. As many AOs are proposed, there is still lacking approach to classify the categories of AO, and to select the appropriate AO within the AO candidates. In this research, each AO can be regarded as a cognitive style or individual dierence. A Cognitive Style and Aggregation Operator (CSAO) model is pro- posed to analyze the mapping ...
متن کاملSupplier selection with multi-criteria group decision making based on interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets (case study on a project-based company)
Supplier selection can be considered as a complicated multi criteria decision-making problem.In this paper the problem of supplier selection is studied in the presence of conflicting evaluations and insufficient information about the criteria and different attitudes of decision makers towards the risk. Most of fuzzy approaches used in multi-criteria group decision making (MCGDM) are non-intuiti...
متن کاملDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees
We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii)...
متن کاملStrategic Voting in Sequential Committees
We consider strategic voting in sequential committees in a common value setting with incomplete information. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii) h...
متن کاملOptimal Delay in Committees
We consider a committee problem in which efficient information aggregation is hindered by differences in preferences. Sufficiently large delays could foster information aggregation but would require commitment. In a dynamic delay mechanism with limited commitment, successive rounds of decision-making are punctuated by delays that are uniformly bounded from above. Any optimal sequence of delays ...
متن کامل