Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints
نویسنده
چکیده
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders’ budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains.
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