Expectation Affects Unconscious Semantic Priming

It is clear that we are able to process semantic information from stimuli that are masked and not consciously perceived according to objective threshold criteria (Bodner & Masson, 2003; Dell’Aqua & Grainger, 2001). It has been argued that these unconscious semantic priming effects cannot be attributed to consciously controlled processes – such as expectancy – since these processes cannot operate for stimuli that subjects are not aware of (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2003; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000). However, conscious expectations – expectations that may arise from instructions that a prime is present – have the potential to influence processing of stimuli of which the subject is not consciously aware. It could influence this processing by “setting” subjects to process a particular type of stimulus, creating a “processing bias”, or it could simply speed up the processing of a stimulus. Are controlled processes necessary for integrating relevant information in the ways that create priming effects?