Evidential Externalism

This is a different question. Call this the Evidence Question. The EvidenceFor Question has received significant attention. Debates in the Bayesian literature about the correct confirmation function, for instance, are aimed at the answering the Evidence-For Question.1 The Evidence Question is somewhat less investigated.2 Nevertheless, it is important. According to prominent epistemological views, an agent’s beliefs should be responsive to his evidence. Bayesian epistemology presents one precise account of how this goes: agents are to update their beliefs by conditionalizing on the evidence received. Without an answer to the Evidence Question, dictums like this are empty. Nicholas Silins ([2005]) has recently offered a partial answer to the Evidence Question. In particular, Silins argues for Evidential Internalism and against Evidential Externalism. According to Silins, Evidential Internalism is the following thesis: