WORKING PAPERS Naked Exclusion by a Dominant Supplier: Exclusive Contracting and Loyalty Discounts
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چکیده
FTC Bureau of Economics working papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analyses and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Bureau of Economics, other Commission staff, or the Commission itself. Upon request, single copies of the paper will be provided. References in publications to FTC Bureau of Economics working papers by FTC economists (other than acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such unpublished materials) should be cleared with the author to protect the tentative character of these papers. ______________________________________________________________________________
منابع مشابه
Naked Exclusion in the Lab: the Case of Sequential Contracting*
In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2000b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes contracts to buyers sequentially, excludes significantly more often than an incumbe...
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