Novel Role of Rural Official Organization in the Biomass-Based Power Supply Chain in China: A Combined Game Theory and Agent-Based Simulation Approach

Developing biomass-based power generation is helpful for China to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels and to release the targets of carbon emission peak. The decentralized farming method leads to Chinese farmers’ weak willingness to collect and sell crop residues to biomass-based power plants. The purpose of this paper is to solve the issue by proposing a novel biomass feedstock supply model with China’s rural official organization—villagers’ committee, which has great influence on villagers’ decision making. Introducing it into the biomass-based power supply chain is beneficial to motivating farmers’ supplying enthusiasm. A combined game theory and agent-based simulation approach is applied to study the effectiveness of this new supply model. Multiple simulation scenarios are built to study impacts of different simulation parameters, and results show that farmers tend to supply more biomass material for electricity production in the proposed villagers’ committee model, compared with the two conventional supply models, direct-deal and broker models. The supply model incorporating the rural official organization can ensure the feedstock sufficiency for plants. A proper model design depends on the feed-in tariff subsidy for biomass-based electricity, feedstock shipping distance, performance appraisal system of the villagers’ committee, as well as farmers’ utility weights on net income and public service improvement.