Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The primary purpose is to revisit Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. The secondary purpose is to examine key case studies from consciousness research in the cognitive sciences. Block has argued that what he calls phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness are completely independent phenomena, and that cognitive scientists have been unduly focused on studying the latter. As against that, I argue that there is an intimate connection between phenomenal and access consciousness: a component of the former is the categorical basis of the latter. I also argue that this vindicates scientific practice in consciousness studies, in that the study of a dispositional property is often a scientific gateway for learning about its categorical basis. Having set out this conceptual framework for understanding the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness, I then consider the presuppositions behind studies of subliminal perception, perception of habituated stimuli, and blindsight, and argue that they are in line with said framework. The overarching goal of the chapter is to contribute to the elucidation of the conceptual foundations of consciousness studies in the cognitive sciences. Key Terms: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight.