Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
Blackwell (1951, 1953) proposes an informativeness ranking of experiments: Experiment I is more Blackwell-informative than Experiment II if and only if the value of experiment I is higher than that of experiment II for all expected-utility maximizers. Under commitment and reduction, our main theorem shows that Blackwell equivalence holds for all convex and strongly monotone preferences, i.e., the uncertainty averse preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2011b), which nest most ambiguity averse preferences commonly used in applications as special cases. Furthermore, we discuss the possibility of extending the equivalence results to the no commitment case for the maxmin expected utility and variational preferences under certain conditions. JEL Classification Numbers: C44, D81.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 96 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016