On Secure Routing in Low-Power and Lossy Networks: The Case of RPL

This master-thesis engages in the security aspect of the newly introduced IPv6-based routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks RPL. In an analysis of the security of RPL, it is shown that RPL protects against most attacks launched by an adversary that does not have access to the security keys. The major threat lies within an attacker who has compromised these keys and who is consequently able to launch topology attacks. Two topology authentication schemes are presented and evaluated which deal with the prevention of such attacks: VeRA and TRAIL. The VeRA approach employs hash chains for veriVcation of the topology of RPL. TRAIL relies on the transmission of a round-trip message that veriVes the topology hop-by-hop. It is shown that these schemes can detect and isolate an insider attacker. A practical evaluation of TRAIL gives a Vrst impression of the delays that result from the veriVcation procedure.