Strategic Free Information Disclosure for a Vickrey Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants’ valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry maximizes the expected revenue. Furthe...
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تاریخ انتشار 2016