Heterogeneous Firms Can Always Collude on a Minimum Price∗
نویسنده
چکیده
When firms are heterogeneous, there may not exist a common collusive price that raises all firms’profits. However it is shown that there always exists a common minimum price that raises all firms’profits.
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تاریخ انتشار 2015