An Ascending Auction with Multidimensional Signals
نویسنده
چکیده
A single-item ascending auction in which agents observe multidimensional Gaussian signals about their valuation of the good is studied. A class of equilibria is constructed in two steps: (i) the private signals of each agent are projected into a one-dimensional equilibrium statistic, and (ii) the equilibrium strategies are constructed “as if” each agent observed only his equilibrium statistic. Novel predictions of ascending auctions that arise only when agents observe multidimensional signals are provided: (i) there may be multiple symmetric equilibria that yield a different social surplus, (ii) a public signal may jointly increase the social surplus and decrease the revenue. JEL Classification: D40, D44, D47, D82, G14
منابع مشابه
Ascending Auctions with Multidimensional Signals
We study an ascending auction of an indivisible good in which agents observe multidimensional Gaussian signals about their valuation of the good. The equilibrium is solved using a two-step procedure. The first step is to project the signals into a one-dimensional equilibrium statistic. The second step is to solve for the equilibrium as if agents observed only the equilibrium statistic (and henc...
متن کاملInformational Size and Efficient Auctions
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders wi...
متن کاملAn Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when the seller is constrained to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid. It extends easily to polymatroids. Applications include scheduling, allocation of homogeneous goods, and spatially distributed markets...
متن کاملAscending Auctions
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowin...
متن کاملTime Bounds for Iterative Auctions with Multiple Differentiated Items: Discrete Convex Analysis Approach*
We discuss an ascending auction in the setting where there are multiple differentiated items in multiple units and each bidder has a gross substitutes valuation. Although the ascending auction is known to find a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in finite time, little is known about its number of iterations until its termination. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the number of iteration...
متن کامل