The Place of Saying and Showing In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Some Later Works

In a letter to Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein complained that the British philosopher did not understand the main message of the Tractatus. He explained that “the main point is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions—i.e., by language . . . and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy” (qtd. in Stern 69–70). This division would be the means by which Wittgenstein would “set a limit . . . to the expression of thoughts” (TLP 3). Despite Wittgenstein’s insistence, many philosophers have been loath to accept his distinction. Russell claimed it left him “with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort,” and assumed this hurdle could be overcome through the implementation of metalanguage (TLP xxi). The possible connection between propositional showing and mystical things that “make themselves manifest” made other thinkers hesitant to accept the distinction (6.522). Some looked at apparent contradictions that arise in the Tractatus regarding the showing notion and assumed that it was