Compliance Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper we analyze compliance games, which are games induced by agent-labeled Kripke structures, goal formulas in the language of ctl and behavioral constraints. In compliance games, players are rewarded for achieving their goals while complying to social laws, and punished for non-compliance. Design of these games is an attempt at incentivizing agents to be compliant. We analyze the core and properties of compliance games, and study the connection between underlying logical framework and their properties.
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