Secure NAND Flash Architecture Resilient to Strong Fault-Injection Attacks Using Algebraic Manipulation Detection Code
نویسندگان
چکیده
Multi-level cell (MLC) NAND flash memories are widely used because of their high data transfer rate, large storage density and long mechanical durability. Linear error correcting codes (ECC) such as Reed-Solomon (RS) codes and Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes are often used for error correction. Although linear codes can efficiently detect and correct random errors, they are not sufficient for protecting NAND flash memories used in cryptographic devices against malicious fault injection attacks. In this paper, we will present an architecture based on the combination of RS codes and Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes which can correct any four byte errors and detect any malicious injected errors with a high probability under the strong attack model. This proposed architecture can significantly improve the security level of the MLC NAND flash memories used in cryptographic devices at the cost of only slightly larger latency and area overhead. Keywords-MLC NAND Flash, Reed-Solomon code, Algebraic Manipulation Detection Code, Error Correction, Fault Injection Attack, Hardware Security
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