Approximations to Auctions for Digital Goods with Externality

نویسندگان

  • Jinxiang Pei
  • Diego Klabjan
چکیده

We consider the case of a digital product with externality, where the product can be sold to multiple buyers who experience some disutility from other firms or consumers owning the same product. We model the problem of selling a digital product with externality as an auction and apply a Bayesian optimal mechanism design. We also design constant-approximation algorithms in the prior-free setting including both averageand worst-case analyses.

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تاریخ انتشار 2012