The Time-Preference Nash Solution
نویسندگان
چکیده
We give an axiomatic characterization of the Time-Preference Nash Solution, a bargaining solution that is applied when the underlying preferences are defined over streams of physical outcomes. This bargaining solution is similar to the ordinal Nash solution introduced by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992), but it gives a different prediction when the set of physical outcomes is a set of lotteries. JEL Classification, C72, C78.
منابع مشابه
Aboa Centre for Economics
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