The G-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we deal with the problem of extending the concept of nucleolus on fuzzy cooperative games. Described a newly invented definition of nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games. We prove that the newly defined nucleolus on the set of classical cooperative games coincides with the previously existing one. It is proved that for separate classes of fuzzy games the nucleolus exists and unique. The process of finding the nucleolus illustrated on an example of a concrete type of fuzzy games.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of Intelligent and Fuzzy Systems
دوره 26 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014