Context, Content, and Relativism∗

Here is a simple and inviting picture: the semantic values of sentences, relative to contexts, are sets of possible worlds. These are the truth conditions of assertions of those sentences in contexts. They are thus the contents of assertions, or the objects of attitudes we might take towards such contents. There have been many questions raised about the simple picture. For instance, sets of worlds might well be too coarse-grained to capture fully the objects of attitudes, leading to more fine-grained or structured contents. But opting for structure does not conflict with truth conditions being sets of worlds, and so, I shall ignore this sort of question. I shall likewise ignore questions about the nature of possible worlds. I propose to ignore these questions to focus on whether the semantic values of sentences should be sets of something more than possible worlds. For instance, it has frequently been proposed that semantic values should be sets of pairs of worlds and times. The simple picture opts for eternalism: semantic values of sentences are eternal truth conditions. This stand in ∗Versions of this paper were presented at a symposium on relativism at the Pacific APA, 2006, the ‘Cog Lunch’ at CSLI, 2006, and the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, 2006. Thanks to the participants at those sessions, and especially to Andy Egan and Thony Gillies, my co-symposiasts at the APA, and Brian Weatherson, my commentator at Bellingham. Thanks to Kent Bach, Chris Barker, Cleo Condoravdi, Benj Hellie, Kathrin Koslicki, John MacFarlane, Robert May, and Adam Sennet for helpful comments on earlier drafts.