Asynchronous Games with Transfers: Uniqueness and Optimality in Infinite Horizon∗
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چکیده
This paper and its companion, Dutta-Siconolfi (2016a) proves a First Welfare Theorem for Games. It shows that infinite horizon asynchronous dynamic games with voluntary one period ahead transfers have a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Utilitarian Pareto Optimum and hence can be computed from a (simpler) programming problem (rather than as a fixed point). The only way that multiplicity can arise is from strategies that have an infinite memory of transfers. JEL: C3, C73.
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تاریخ انتشار 2017