Pure Bargaining Problems with a Coalition Structure

نویسندگان

  • Francesc Carreras
  • Guillermo Owen
چکیده

We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: individual behavior, cooperative behavior, isolated unions behavior, and bargaining unions behavior. The latter two respectively recall the treatment given by Aumann–Drèze and Owen to cooperative games with a coalition structure. A numerical example illustrates the procedure. We provide criteria to compare any pair of behaviors for each agent, introduce and axiomatically characterize a modified Shapley rule, and determine its natural domain, that is, the set of problems where the bargaining unions behavior is the best option for all agents.

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تاریخ انتشار 2016